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DUTY OF A PLEDGEE UNDER SECTION 9-207
I. SECTION 9-207
The remaining assets of an insolvent debtor are commonly insufficient to
satisfy all of his debts. To protect themselves against a debtor's insolvency,
creditors often take security interests in specific personal property of their
debtors.' This interest assures the creditor of the satisfaction of the debt, up
to the value of the collateral, unless another creditor has a superior security
interest.2
 Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code was adopted to regulate
the various transactions which involve security interests in personal property. 3
Under Article 9, a security interest may be created in many ways, including
pledge, chattel mortgage, trust deed, conditional sale and consignment. 4
When a security interest is created by pledge, a special problem arises.
Since the creditor holds the secured property, it might be damaged, destroyed
or devalued while in his possession. Under what circumstances the creditor is
liable for such a loss is an important question. Section 9-207 of the Code
establishes the liability of a pledgee by providing:
A secured party must use reasonable care in the custody and preser-
vation of collateral in his possession. In the case of an instrument"'
or chattel paper6 reasonable care includes taking necessary steps to
preserve rights against prior parties unless otherwise agreed.? (Foot-
notes added.)
Section 9-207(3 ) adds that "[a] secured party is liable for any loss caused by
his failure to meet [these] . . . obligation[s]. . . ." The extent of the duty
of care imposed by section 9-207 is not clearly defined. "Reasonable care"
as it relates to pledgees is not defined in any section of the Code,s and it is
1 For a general discussion of the use of security interests to protect against bank-
ruptcy, see 1 P. Coogan, W. Hogan and D. Vagts, Secured Transactions under the Uni-
form Commercial Code § 1.04 (1967).
2 For rules establishing priorities among conflicting creditors' claims, see U.C.C.
§§ 9-301, 9-307, 9-308, 9-309, 9-310, 9-312, 9-313, 9-314, 9-315, 9-316. All Uniform Com-
mercial Code citations are to the 1962 Official Text.
A party with a security interest is subject also to the applicable provisions of the
Federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1964), as amended, (Supp. III, as amended
1965-67).
3 U.C.C. § 9-101, Comment.
4 See U.C.C. § 9-102(2).
5 "Instrument" is defined by U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (g) as being any
writing which evidences a right to the payment of money and is not itself a
security agreement or lease and is of a type which is in ordinary course of
business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.
6 "Chattel paper" is defined by U.C.C. § 9-105(1) (b) as being
a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a security
interest in or a lease of specific goods. When a transaction is evidenced both by
such a security agreement or a lease and by an instrument or a series of instru-
ments, the group of writings taken together constitutes chattel paper.
I U.C.C. § 9-207(1).
8 "Reasonable care" for warehousemen and carriers is given a general definition in
§§ 7-204 and 7-309. See U.C.C. §§ 7-204(1), 7-204, Comment, 7-309(1), 7-309, Comment.
However, the broad language of the definitions does not help in the determination of the
duties to be imposed on a pledgee § 9-207. Section 7-204(1) states:
301
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
not certain what "preserving rights against prior parties" means. Moreover,
there is no indication whether the "preserving of rights" is the extent of the
pledgee's duty of reasonable care toward instruments and chattel paper. If
reasonable care does encompass other duties, there is no indication of what
they are. The purpose of this comment is to analyze the scope of the duty of
reasonable care imposed by section 9-207. This analysis will focus on the
section itself and the comments thereto, the duty of a pledgee under prior
law, and the only two cases decided under section 9-207, both of which con-
sider the duty owed by a pledgee holding convertible debentures.°
Comment 1 to section 9-207 states that the pledgee's duty of reasonable
care is "the duty to preserve collateral imposed on a pledgee at common law."
This Comment cites Sections 17 10 and 1811 of the Restatement of Security as
prior codifications of the common law duty. Comment a to section 17 states
that reasonable care is "confined to the physical care of the chattel, whether
A warehouseman is liable for damages for loss of or injury to the goods caused
by his failure to exercise such care in regard to them as a reasonably careful
man would exercise under like circumstances but unless otherwise agreed he is
not liable for damages which could not have been avoided by the exercise of
such care.
A carrier ... must exercise the degree of care in relation to the goods which
a reasonably careful man would exercise under like circumstances. This subsection
does not repeal or change any law or rule of law which imposes liability upon a
common carrier for damages not caused by its negligence.
The only other section of the Code that discusses the duties to be imposed upon a party
under a reasonable care test is § 4-103, which relates to the duties of banks in connection
with their role in the bank collection process. Section 4-103 states that a bank is liable for
failure to exercise "ordinary care," which is often said to be synonymous with "reasonable
care." See, e.g., Hotels El Rancho v. Pray, 64 Nev. 591, 619, 187 P.2d 568, 582 (1947);
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Shelton, 135 Okla. 53, 55, 273 P. 988:990 (1929). However, as
stated in Comment 4 to § 4-103, "ordinary care" is not generally defined in the section.
Thus § 4-103 is also not useful in determining the "reasonable care" duties of a pledgee.
It has been suggested that, although the Code does not adequately define "reasonable
care," "the general standard may well be further refined by the test of 'commercial reason-
ableness' used for both secured parties' and sellers' disposition of goods upon debtor's or
buyer's breach [under §§ 2-706 and 9-504 of the Code:I." W. Wilier & F. Hart, Forms
and Procedures under the Uniform Commercial Code .T 94.46 (1965). This test is not
helpful for defining reasonable care under § 9-207 because the general term "commercially
reasonable" is not defined by §§ 2-706 or 9-504.
9 "A debenture, ordinarily, is an obligation of corporations, or, large moneyed copart-
nerships, issued in a form convenient to be bought and sold as investments." Shamrock
Oil & Gas Co. v. Campbell, 107 F. Supp. 764, 766 (N.D. Tex. 1952). "[T]he normal
. distinction between a corporate bond and a corporate debenture or note, is that the
former is usually secured by a mortgage, while the latter usually is not." Fine v. H.
Klein, Inc., 10 N.J. Super. 295, 299, 77 A.2d 295, 298 (Essex County Ct. 1950). A con-
vertible debenture is one that can he exchanged for stock.
10 Restatement of Security § 17 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Restatement] provides:
The pledgee owes to the pledgor the duty of reasonable care of the pledged
chattel except where the chattel is in the possession of a third person designated
by the pledgor or is in the possession of the pledgor himself.
11 Section 18 of the Restatement states:
Where instruments representing claims of the pledgor against third persons are
pledged, the pledgee has the duty of using reasonable diligence to preserve and
collect the claims or to enable the pledgor to undertake such preservation and
collection.
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an object such as a horse or piece of jewelry, or a negotiable instrument or
document of title." However, " [i]n the case of an instrument or document
the pledgee also has other duties in certain circumstances." As an example of
the additional duties imposed upon a pledgee, section 18 cites the duty either
to collect on a matured instrument or to enable his pledgor to do so. 12 It is
not clear from the language in sections 17 and 18 whether the duty to collect
is the only duty in addition to that of physical preservation that is owed by
a pledgee to an instrument. But if the requirement of reasonable care places
any other duties on a pledgee, sections 17 and 18 make no reference to them.
Despite their failure to present a clear definition of reasonable sare, section
9-207 and Sections 17 and 18 of the Restatement appeared to have defined
adequately the pledgee's duty of reasonable care for more than a decade,
because no disputes regarding its meaning reached the courts. Within the last
two years, however, two courts, one in Massachusetts and the other in New
York, have considered the extent of the duty of reasonable care under
section 9-207.
In both cases, the pledgees failed to exchange convertible bearer deben-
tures for stock worth a great deal more than the face value of the debentures.
The pledgors claimed that Section 9-207 of the Code requires a pledgee to
convert bonds to stock in order to comply with his duty of "reasonable care."
These cases raise important questions about section 9-207. First, does the
pledgee's duty of reasonable care encompass any duties in addition to those
of the physical preservation of collateral and the collection of matured instru-
ments? Second, if there are additional duties, what are the criteria for deter-
mining whether the section 9-207 obligation of "reasonable care" requires
a certain act to be performed by a pledgee? Finally, what are the ramifications
of the Massachusetts and New York courts' interpretations of section 9-207?
II. THE CASES
In the Massachusetts case, Traverse v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co.,13 the
plaintiff pledged twenty-five bearer convertible debentures as collateral for a
loan to the Liberty Bank and Trust Company (Liberty). The bonds had
been purchased by the plaintiff for $59,446.88, although they had a face
value of only $25,000. Their price was greatly influenced, however, by the
price of the common stock into which they were convertible. While Liberty
held the debentures, a notice of redemption was published by the issuer of
the bonds in the Wall Street Journal. The notice stated that the owners of the
12
 Restatement § 18 provides that where the pledge is an instrument which repre-
sents the claim of the pledgor against a third party, the pledgee must use reasonable
diligence to preserve and collect the claims or to enable the pledgor to take such action.
Thus, upon the maturity of an instrument or chattel paper within his possession, a
pledgee must either make a timely presentment for payment or permit his pledgor to do
so. When timely presentment has not been made, the pledgee will be liable for any loss
caused by the insolvency or discharge of the obligor or indorser of the instrument or
chattel paper. The pledgee will be similarly liable if the obligor or indorser is relieved
from payment by the statute of limitations. See Restatement § 18, comment a and
illustrations 1-4.
Also the pledgee must file a proof of claim if the obligor becomes insolvent "unless
he enables the pledgor to file such a claim." Id. at § IS, comment a.
1 n 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 535 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1967).
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debentures would lose their conversion rights as of a fixed date in the future.
After that date the value of the bonds would be approximately the same as
their face value.' 4
 Liberty did not require any of its employees to keep in-
formed of such a notice. Moreover, the bonds were being held by Liberty's
note teller who knew neither what a convertible security was nor what affected
its value. Nonetheless, an officer of Liberty who handled the plaintiff's loan
did actually see the published notice. However, he did not attempt to notify
the plaintiff. The stock that could have been received in exchange for the
debentures was worth approximately $78,000, but the redemption date passed
without exercise of the plaintiff's conversion rights. Since the bonds were
worth only slightly more than their face value of $25,000 after the redemp-
tion date, the plaintiff suffered a loss of almost $53,000. She claimed that her
loss was caused by Liberty's failure to convert the debentures into stock and
that this omission was a violation of Liberty's duty of reasonable care under
Section 9-207 of the Code.
The Massachusetts court agrees with the plaintiff, and it presents several
arguments to support its conclusion. The first begins with the premise that
a pledgee must exercise reasonable care toward convertible debentures under
section 9-207. This premise is clearly valid, because under section 9-207 a
pledgee has the duty of reasonable care towards all collateral. 15 The court's
next argument states a general rule under the common law that the duty of
reasonable care is to be defined by consideration of all the circumstances of
the pledge and the character of the collateral. 1c The court reasonably infers
that each type of collateral requires a different kind of care, and that the
reasonable care of convertible debentures requires that their convertibility
characteristics be considered. Consequently, it finds that a pledgee who fails
to give thought to conversion rights has not exercised the care required by
section 9-207. Under this reasoning Liberty was held liable for failing to
exercise the care required by section 9-207, because the note teller who cared
for the bonds knew nothing of their conversion characteristics.
The court's specific ruling that conversion rights must be considered in
the determination of compliance with the section 9-207 duty of reasonable
care does not require a pledgee to convert bonds or to inform his pledgor of a
redemption notice, which are the acts that must be performed to avoid a loss
such as the one that occurred in Traverse. Consequently, even if there is a
duty under section 9-207 to take conversion rights into consideration in
caring for debentures, a pledgee in Liberty's situation should not be held
liable for the devaluation of the bonds unless it had the additional duty of
exchanging the debentures for stock or of notifying the pledgor of a published
call to redeem.
The court presents another line of reasoning which attempts to establish
that section 9-207 requires a pledgee to convert; or notify. At common law a
14 The bonds were redeemable at 103.25% of the face value phis interest accrued
to the redemption date. Id. at 537.
15 See U.C.C. § 9-207(1).
16 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 539.
For cases stating the rule at common Iaw see, e.g., Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Turner, 156 Miss. 842, 127 So. 291 (1930); Cutting v. Marlor, 78 N.Y. 454 (1879).
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pledgee's primary duty is to hold the collateral in its original form so that the
pledgor can redeem his property at any time by payment of his debt, and
thus retake it in the form originally given. 17 Unless this were the rule, the
pledgor would probably be unwilling to give possession of his goods and secu-
rities to a pledgee, and an important method of financing would be lost.
When convertible debentures are called for redemption, it is impossible to
hold them in their original form, because they must either be exchanged for
stock or become unconvertible bonds. Under these circumstances, a pledgee's
duty under section 9-207 is to hold the collateral in a form and of a value
most similar to the original. 18 Applying this reasoning, the court finds that
Liberty had the duty to convert the bonds, because the value of the stock
that would have been received was closer to the value of the convertible deben-
tures than to that of the debentures after the plaintiff's conversion rights
were lost."
The court's conclusion does not logically follow from the common law
rule that a pledgee is to care for the collateral so that a pledgor can have
returned exactly what he gave the pledgee. At common law, the pledgee's
duty of reasonable care arose from the fact that the pledgee had the actual
and exclusive control of the pledgor's goods, so that the pledgor had no power
to protect his property from harm. Thus, the courts imposed upon the pledgee
the duty to care for the pledged property with reasonable diligence. 20 Con-
sequently, it appears that the pledgee ohad to provide the necessary care for
the pledged goods which the pledgor was unable to provide. For example,
when the collateral is in the pledgee's possession, the pledgee is generally the
only party who has the ability to take precautions against theft. Accordingly, it
has been held that he has the duty to guard against theft. 2' Nonetheless,
where a particular precaution could have been taken by the pledgor, the
pledgee has been relieved of the duty to act. Thus, when a pledgor had the
right to inspect his goods at the warehouse in which the pledgee stored them,
the pledgee did not have the duty to inspect the goods to discover whether
conditions of decay existed. 22 When an act necessary for the protection of
pledged property can be performed by the pledgor, the law does not impose
upon the pledgee the duty to perform that act. Since section 9-207 states the
pledgee's duty at common law," it follows that this rule applies to the
pledgee's duty of reasonable care under section 9-207.
The ability to look for redemption notices in a newspaper such as the
Wall Street Journal is not limited to those who have the exclusive possession
17 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 540. For a statement of the rule at common Iaw, see War-
field v. Adams, 215 Mass. 506, 515, 102 N.E. 706, 710 (1913) ; 41 Am. Jur. Pledge and
Collateral Security § 75 (1942).
13 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 540.
19
 Id.
20 See Willets v. Hatch, 132 N.Y. 41, 30 N.E. 253 (1892) ; 72 C.J.S. Pledges ; 33
(1951) ; Restatement § 18 and comment a at 67 (1941).
21 See Adye v. Grossman, 214 Ore. 363, 329 P.2d 1116 (1958) ; Bank of Monango v.
Ellendale Nat'l Bank, 52 N.D. 8, 201 N.W. 839 (1924) ; 41 Am. Jur. Pledge and Col-
lateral Security § 50 (1942) ; Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1259 (1959).
22 Mallets v. Hatch, 132 N.Y. 41, 30 N.E. 253 (1892).
23 U.C.C. § 9-207, Comment 1.
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of convertible securities, and the plaintiff, as well as Liberty, was able to per-
form the act necessary to protect the value of the bonds. In the light of the
above rule, these facts indicate that Liberty should not be held liable for
the depreciation of the debentures. The court reaches a contrary conclusion,
but states that a pledgee may fulfill his section 9-207 duty of reasonable care
by notifying his pledgor of a redemption notic:e. 24 Consequently, the only
acts necessary for a pledgee to comply with section 9-207 are those of keeping
informed of published redemption notices and of notifying his pledgor of
them.25 However, since the plaintiff also could keep informed of notices
of redemption, Liberty should not have borne the duty to do 50. 26
The Restatement of Security supports this conclusion. It states that a
pledgee has the duty to notify his pledgor only when the knowledge is peculiar
to the pledgee.27 An example is given of a situation in which a pledgee has
the duty of notification. It involves a corporation which notifies by mail only
the holders of securities of any opportunity to convert their securities, and the
pledgee as holder of the securities received a notice while his pledgor did
not.28
 This is an obviously different situation from that in the Traverse case
where the redemption notice was published in the Wall Street Journal. 29
It is important to note that the Massachusetts court held as a matter of
law that the pledgee, Liberty, was obliged by the reasonable care requirement
of section 9-207 at least to notify its pledgor of a redemption notice. To the
contrary, the New York court does not treat section 9-207 as meaning that a
pledgee will necessarily have the duty to inform his pledgor as a matter of
law.
In the New York case, Grace v. Sterling, Grace, & Co.," the plaintiff
pledged convertible bearer debentures, worth $25,000 on their face, to the
24 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 541.
25 The pledgor can then decide whether to convert the bonds and instruct the
pledgee accordingly. Id.
26 Moreover, the court concedes that an obligation to convert the debentures ought
not to be imposed on a pledgee, because the conversion of debentures imposes too great
a burden on the pledgee. Id. Converting debentures upon a redemption notice is not always
sound business conduct because the price of the stock that can be received might fall after
the conversion. Since the price of the stock might fall, a pledgee bears the risk that the
conversion will be deemed not "commercially reasonable." See note 8 supra.
27 Section 21 of the Restatement states:
(1) Where changes must be made in pledged corporate securities or in
other pledged chattels during the existence of the pledge, as the result of a power
exercised by the corporation issuing the securities or a power exercised by govern-
ment or other third person, and a choice is allowed in respect to such change,
the pledgor can make the choice but he must act with reasonable promptness and
so far as possible maintain the value of the pledgee's interest. Where the pledgor
has made such a choice, it is the duty of the pledgee to perform any act within
his power which is necessary to effectuate this choice.
(2) Where the proposed changes are peculiarly within the knowledge of
the pledgee, he has a duty to notify the pledgor of the proposed changes.
[Emphasis added.]
(3) Where the pledgor refuses, or after reasonable opportunity, neglects to
express a decision, the pledgee's choice is binding on the pledgor.
28 Restatement § 21, illustration 3.
20 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 537.
30 30 App. Div. 2d 61, 289 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1968).
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brokerage firm of Sterling, Grace, and Company (Sterling) as collateral for
a loan. In turn, the brokerage firm repledged the bonds to the Cleveland Trust
Company (Cleveland) also as collateral for a loan. Because its facilities were
outside New York City and because Sterling wanted the right to substitute
securities, Cleveland deposited these securities and others with the Irving
Trust Company in New York City. In the custodian agreement, there was a
provision that the Irving Trust Company "would 'not endeavor to keep
[Cleveland] informed of changes affecting the collateral, such as conversions,
rights to subscribe, collection of dividends, etc.' "31
While the debentures were in the possession of the Irving Trust Company
and the plaintiff was traveling abroad, notice was given by publication that
the bonds were being called for redemption, At that time, the market value
of the stock was approximately twice the face value of the debentures. No
party sought to convert the bonds into stock, and no attempt was made to
inform the plaintiff of the notice for redemption. Consequently, the redemp-
tion date passed without the conversion of the bonds, and the value of the
bonds was diminished by almost $25,000.
Plaintiff brought an action against Sterling and Cleveland, alleging that
their failure to exercise reasonable care as required by section 9-207 caused
her to suffer a loss of $24,490. The lower court held that Sterling was liable
for the loss. Cleveland, however, received a summary judgment in its favor
because plaintiff did not have privity with it. On appeal, the decision against
Sterling was upheld and the summary judgment for Cleveland was vacated.
The court ruled "that the record as a matter of law supports the liability of
Sterling." 22 The court did not specify the facts of the record creating Sterling's
liability. It is not entirely clear whether it found Sterling to have the duty
of notifying plaintiff merely because Sterling was an ordinary pledgee bound
by section 9-207 or whether the duty was imposed for some other reasons.
Because plaintiff was the wife of a partner of Sterling," a relationship might
have existed between pledgor and pledgee requiring Sterling to exercise more
care than an ordinary pledgee.
However, from the court's opinion regarding Cleveland's liability, it is
obvious that it does not hold that a sub-pledgee has the duty either to convert
debentures upon the publication of a redemption notice or to inform the pled-
gor of the notice. Cleveland's summary judgment was vacated because its lack
of privity with plaintiff was held not to bar plaintiff's action under section
9-207.24 Eliminating the question of privity, the court treated Cleveland as
an ordinary pledgee. If the court had held that a pledgee as a matter of law has
the duty to convert or notify, then it would have found that the record as a
matter of law established Cleveland's liability. To the contrary, the court
held that the question of Cleveland's liability was a mixed question of fact
and law."
The court supports its ruling that the question of privity is irrelevant to
31 Id. at —, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
32 Id. at —, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
33 Id. at —, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
24 Id. at —, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
n 5 Id. at —, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
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Cleveland's liability with the general common law rule that the duty to exer-
cise reasonable care is imposed by law and is not imposed by the pledge
contract.36
 Therefore an actual transaction between a pledgor and a sub-
pledgee does not have to take place for the duty of reasonable care to be
placed on a sub-pledgee. The court adds that the trend of the law is to remove
privity as an element in establishing a cause of action against defendants who
have caused a loss by failure to exercise reasonable care. 37
The court's reasoning and conclusion on the question of privity and its
treatment of Cleveland as an ordinary pledgee are sound. Whatever duty is
imposed on a pledgee ought to be placed on a sub-pledgee, because the basic
reason for the imposition of the duty is present. By virtue of the sub-pledgee's
possession of the collateral, he is the only party who can perform, certain acts
in care of the property and assure that the pledgor will have returned exactly
what he gave the pledgee." The Grace court, however, fails to discuss the
important question whether a pledgee should remain liable to his pledgor
after the pledgee has given possession of the collateral to the sub-pledgee and
thus no longer has more power than the pledgor to protect the collateral.
The answer to this question must be that the pledgee's liability remains after
a sub-pledge. Otherwise, the pledgee could effectively relieve himself of all
duties of reasonable care by repledging the collateral to a corporation with
very limited funds. However, the pledgee should have the right of subrogation
against the sub-pledgee when the sub-pledgee is the only party who could
have performed the act necessary to preserve the collateral and when the
loss is caused by the sub-pledgee's failure to exercise reasonable care.
Eliminating the requirement of privity, the court attempts to establish
that Cleveland, as a pledgee, is required by the section 9-207 duty of reason-
able care under certain circumstances at least to inform his pledgor of a pub-
lished notice to redeem convertible debentures. The thrust of the reasoning is an
analogy between the conversion of debentures and the collection of matured
instruments." As has been noted, when an instrument matures in the posses-
sion of a pledgee, the pledgee has the duty under section 9-207 to make a timely
presentment of the instrument for payment." The court reasons that since
section 9-207 requires an affirmative act in the maturing note cases, a similar
act might be required when bonds are called for redemption. However, the
court's analogy is not valid to establish that the section 9-207 duty of reason-
able care requires a pledgee to convert bonds or at least to notify his pledgor
of a redemption notice. When an instrument matures it is generally very sound
business conduct to present the instrument for payment. In addition, when a
pledgee holds an instrument, he is usually the only party who can make present-
ment.'". For this reason, the duty to make a timely presentment has been im-
36 Id. at	 , 289 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
On this point of law, see 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bailments § 198 (1963) ; 8 C.J.S. Bailments
§ 26 (1962). These citations refer to the duty of a bailee, but a pledgee is a type of
bailee. Restatement § 1, comment a.
87 30 App. Div. 2d at —, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 638-39.
38 See note 17 supra, and accompanying text.
89 30 App. Div. 2d at —, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
40 See note 12 supra.
41 Section 3-504(1) of the Code states: "Presentment is a demand for acceptance or
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posed on him 42 By contrast, the conversion of debentures upon publication of
a notice of redemption is not always sound conduct. The possibility exists that
the value of the stock will be less than the face value of the bonds or become
less after the conversion is made. It can be inferred that the court recognizes
this factor when it rules that a pledgee may fulfill his section 9-207 duty of
reasonable care by notifying his pledgor of a redemption notice. 43 In effect,
the ruling that section 9-207 requires a pledgee to notify his pledgor causes
the pledgee to search for published redemption notices. This is an act neces-
sary for the preservation of the value of convertible debentures, but it is an
act that can be performed by the pledgor as well. Thus, whereas under section
9-207 the requirement that a pledgee present a matured note obliges him to
perform an act which only he could perform, under the court's interpretation
of section 9-207, a pledgee would be required to do what the pledgor can do
as well, namely to look for redemption notices. As noted in the discussion of
the Traverse case, the ability of the pledgor to perform an act necessary for
the protection of the value of the collateral appears to be crucial in the deter-
mination whether the pledgee has the duty to perform that act.
The court seems to recognize the importance of the pledgor's ability to
keep informed of redemption notices. It suggests that, if Cleveland had reason
to believe that Sterling owned the debentures outright instead of being a
pledgee, then Cleveland would not have any duty under section 9-207 to
notify Sterling of the call to redeem because Sterling had the ability to dis-
cover this information itself.44 The court, however, points out that because
of the circumstances, "Cleveland may be considered to have been on notice
that . . . the securities pledged by Sterling were individually owned by cus-
tomers or other third persons having business relationships with Sterling." 4a
Thus while the court indicates that its decision would be different if the
original pledgor had the ability to keep informed of redemption notices, it
also suggests that a pledgor who is merely an individual investor and not a
brokerage firm does not have that ability. This suggestion would seem to
lack basis in fact, because an individual investor as well as a brokerage firm
can look in newspapers for redemption notices. Because it failed to take into
consideration the crucial factor of the pledgor's ability to keep informed of
published redemption notices, the court's application of section 9-207 in
Grace appears to be erroneous. The fact that the plaintiff was traveling abroad
ought not to be relevant, even if the plaintiff could not purchase the nekivspaper
in which the notice of redemption was published. The duty to perform acts
to preserve collateral are imposed on a pledgee when the pledgor is unable to
payment made upon the maker, acceptor, drawee or other payor by or on behalf of the
holder." A "holder" is defined by § 1-201(20) of the Code as "a person who is in posses-
sion of a document of title or an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or
indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank." Thus the pledgee, the holder of
the instrument, is the only person who can initiate the presentment of the instrument.
42 Restatement § 18, comment a states that a pledgee may be relieved of his duty
to collect on an instrument by enabling the pledger to collect. It is obvious that the duty
is placed on the pledgee only when the pledgor cannot make a presentment for collection
himself.
43 30 App. Div. 2d at —, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
44 Id. at —, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
42 Id.
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perform them because he has given possession of the collateral to the pledgee.
The pledgee should not acquire more duties toward the collateral merely
because the pledgor becomes unable to perform certain acts for other reasons,
such as traveling abroad.
Although it is submitted that the New York court's interpretation of
section 9-207 is erroneous, that interpretation is the law in New York and
it consequently might affect the law in other jurisdictions. Insofar as the
court established the proposition that under certain circumstances section
9-207 requires a pledgee to inform its pledgor of a redemption notice, it is
important to note the factors which the court deems important to the creation
of this duty. The court first listed them in the following general terms: the
" 'nature and value of the property, and the means of protection possessed
by the bailee and the relation of the parties and other circumstances. . . "44
It then catalogued a number of specific facts tending to indicate that Cleve-
land had the duty under section 9-207 to inform the plaintiff of the notice.
These facts were as follows: the value of the debentures depended a great
deal upon their conversion rights; Cleveland most likely knew of the bonds'
convertibility features; Cleveland occasionally reviewed and appraised the
securities which it held as collateral; Cleveland had a department to check
for notices of conversion or redemption as a service for its individual cus-
tomers; and the custodian agreement with Irving Trust Company put Cleve-
land on notice that it had some responsibility toward the conversion rights,
because the Irving Trust Company disclaimed any duty to keep Cleveland
informed of changes affecting the collatera1. 47 All of the facts listed except
the last one tend to establish that the conversion rights were valuable and
that Cleveland could easily have kept informed of conversion notices. The
last circumstance listed by the court raises an inference that if Irving Trust
Company had not disclaimed the duty to keep Cleveland informed of con-
version rights, then the court would not have held that section 9-207 required
Cleveland to keep itself informed. In other words, if a pledgee repledges or
bails a convertible debenture to a party who does not disclaim the duty to
keep informed of redemption notices, then the pledgee is relieved of that
duty. This inference, however, does not appear to be valid because, although
Sterling repledged the bonds to Cleveland who did not disclaim the duty,
Sterling was still held liable for the plaintiff's loss. 48
Another significant aspect of the Grace case was the non-liability of
Irving Trust Company. Whether it could be held liable if it had not made its
disclaimer is an additional question. The answer to it, however, is outside
the scope of section 9-207, because it was an ordinary bailee and not a secured
party subject to section 9-207. 40 It is, however, relevant to the scope of the
section 9-207 duty of reasonable care to ask whether a pledgee can disclaim
its duty in the same manner as did the Irving Trust Company. The answer
given by Comment 1 to section 9-207 is that
46 Id. at —, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 639. For cases stating the rule at common law see
note 16 supra.
47 Id. at —, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
48 The court does not determine whether Sterling or Cleveland bears the ultimate
liability or if both are liable as joint tortfeasors. Id. at --, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
49 See U.C.C. § 9-207(1).
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the duty to exercise reasonable care may not be disclaimed by agree-
ment, although ... the parties remain free to determine by agree-
ment, in any manner not manifestly unreasonable, what shall
constitute reasonable care in a particular case.
CONCLUSION
Both the Massachusetts and New York courts interpret section 9-207
as imposing a duty upon a pledgee to inform his pledgor of a notice to redeem.
However, while the Massachusetts court would apply this duty in all instances,
the New York court would impose the duty only under certain circumstances.
Furthermore, the New York court holds that a sub-pledgee is to be treated
as an ordinary pledgee under section 9-207.
If pledgees are to avoid liability in jurisdictions interpreting section
9-207 as New York and Massachusetts do, they must either keep informed
of redemption notices and notify their pledgors of them, or draft into their
pledge contracts a definition of reasonable care which excludes the necessity
of searching for calls to redeem. The second option, however, carries the
danger of a decision that such an exclusion is manifestly unreasonable and
therefore invalid under Comment 1 to section 9-207. If, however, the clause
is conspicuous and there are no indications of undue influence on the part of
a sophisticated pledgee against a naive pledgor, there is no reason to believe
that such an exclusionary clause would be held manifestly unreasonable.
The language of section 9-207 was not very useful to the solution of the
problems presented to the Massachusetts and New York courts. The section
lacks any reference to the duty of a pledgee when the collateral must be
changed, such as when convertible debentures are called for redemption. The
absence of such language may reflect the intent to place no duty on a pledgee
in such a situation. But this conclusion remains far from clear. Section 21
of the Restatement of Security does provide for situations where the form of
the collateral must be changed." Its incorporation into section 9-207 would
greatly clarify the duty of a pledgee in relation to convertible debentures.
Under the Restatement, a pledgee has the duty to inform his pledgor of a
redemption notice if it is "peculiarly within the knowledge of the pledgee.""
This standard provides a specific guideline for the determination whether a
pledgee has the duty to inform his pledgor. Under the Restatement rules, the
pledgor has the right to choose what to do with the collateral, and the pledgee
must effectuate the choice. If, however, "the pledgor refuses, or after reason-
able opportunity, neglects to express a decision, the pledgee's choice is binding
on the pledgor." 52 These Restatement rules apply only when the change in
collateral is compulsory, such as when debentures must either be redeemed
or converted.53
 Without this stipulation, a pledgor could force a pledgee to
speculate with collateral at any time by requesting the pledgee to convert
to stock, and thus could endanger the pledgee's secured position. If these
Restatement rules were incorporated into section 9-207, the law regarding
50 Restatement § 21, supra note 27.
51 Restatement § 21(2).
52 Restatement § 21(3).
52 Restatement § 21, comment a.
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a pledgee's duty in relation to convertible securities and especially in relation
to the problems of the Traverse and Grace cases would obviously be greatly
clarified.
Application of the reasoning of the Restatement rules to other situations
which might arise under section 9-207 will help to clarify the pledgee's duty of
reasonable care. In order to comply with this duty, a pledgee must take
affirmative action when that action can be performed only as a consequence
of possession of the collateral. The extent to which the pledgee must act will
necessarily be determined by the nature of the collateral and the conditions of
the pledge agreement.
GERALD J. HOENIG
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